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We illustrate the use of a class of statistical models, finite mixture models, that can be
used to allow for differences in model parameterizations across groups, even in the ab-
sence of group labels. We also introduce a methodology for fitting these models, data
augmentation. Neither finite mixture models nor data augmentation is routine in the world
of political science methodology, but both are quite standard in the statistical literature.
The techniques are applied to an investigation of the empirical support for a theory (devel-
oped fully by Hill and Kriesi 2001) that extends Converse’s (1964) “black-and-white” model
of response stability. Our model formulation enables us (1) to provide reliable estimates
of the size of the two groups of individuals originally distinguished in this model, opinion
holders and unstable opinion changers; (2) to examine the evidence for Converse’s basic
claim that these unstable changers truly exhibit nonattitudes; and (3) to estimate the size
of a newly defined group, durable changers, whose members exhibit more stable opinion
change. Our application uses survey data collected at four time points over nearly 2 years
which track Swiss citizens’ readiness to support pollution-reduction policies. The results,
combined with flexible model checks, provide support for portions of Converse and Zaller’s
(1992) theories on response instability and appear to weaken the measurement-error ar-
guments of Achen (1975) and others. This paper concentrates on modeling issues and
serves as a companion paper to Hill and Kriesi (2001), which uses the same data set and
model but focuses more on the details of the opinion-changing behavior debate.
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1 Introduction
PREVIOUSLY (Hill and Kriesi 2001) we considered the debate among Converse (1964),
Achen (1975), and Zaller (1992) regarding opinion stability by using a mixture model fit
via data augmentation. In this paper we lay out the statistical foundations of that model as
well as the estimation algorithm employed. We demonstrate how this approach allows us
to build and fit a model specifically tailored to the political science questions of primary
interest.
In 1964, Philip Converse put forth his “black-and-white” theory of opinion stability. He
tested this theory using ad hoc methods and found support for this simple model with only
one of the survey items he had at his disposal. This theory has yet to be tested using more
sophisticated techniques and a more realistic version of the model.
In Converse’s black-and-white model, there are two groups of individuals—a perfectly
stable group and a random group. We refer to these, respectively, as opinion holders and
vacillating changers. We extend Converse’s model in a way that allows us to separate out
a small but substantively important third group of individuals—those who make stable
opinion changes—from those who appear to make more unstable changes (the vacillating
changers). This distinction leads to a more refined profile of the unstable or “vacillating”
changers that, in turn, yields a sharper estimate of their true percentage in the population and
facilitates a more detailed examination of whether they truly seem to exhibit what Converse
(1964) referred to as “non-attitudes.”
The methodological problem in fitting this model to survey data is that the true group
classification for any given survey respondent is unknown. For example, although an indi-
vidual may respond in a way that appears to be perfectly stable over time, she in fact may
be doing so by chance and, thus, might still be a vacillating changer. Her responses provide
us with information about which group classification appears more likely, but they do not
determine this classification.
A finite mixture model (Everitt and Hand 1981; Titterington et al. 1985; Lindsay 1995)
provides us with a straightforward mapping from our theoretical model that postulates three
latent classes of people because it is specifically intended for this sort of situation where
group labels are missing. We show how this model can be fit using a statistical algorithm
known as data augmentation (Tanner and Wong 1987). We use flexible model checks in
the form of posterior predictive checks and Bayes factors to compare competing models
and test substantive hypotheses. The results provide empirical support for aspects of both
Converse’s black-and-white model and Zaller’s (1992) notion of responder ambivalence.
They provide evidence against the measurement-error explanation of response instability
(e.g. see Achen 1975).1
2 Opinion-Changing Behavior
2.1 The Data
The data come from a Swiss study on pollution abatement policies. The issues involve
regulation of the use of citizen’s cars and were publicly debated in Switzerland at the
time of the study. Responses to questions regarding each of the following six policies were
measured at four time points over 2 years (December 1993; Spring 1994; Summer 1994; Fall
1For a more detailed description of the placement of our argument within the context of this debate please see Hill
and Kriesi (2001).
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1995): speed limits, a tax on CO2 (implying a price increase for gas of about 10centimes/L),
a large price increase for gas (up to 2fr./L), promotion of electrical vehicles, car-free zones,
and parking restrictions.
The first two waves have complete responses from 1062 respondents. However, there
are missing data in the third and fourth time periods. Overall, complete data exist for 669
respondents; the missing data rates for each individual question are all approximately 37%.
We use a complete-case approach for the current analyses. That is, for the analysis of each
question we include only individuals who responded at all four time points. Theoretically,
we should use a more principled approach to missing data (see, e.g., Little and Rubin 1987).
However, separate work examining the implications of different missing data assumptions
for this study demonstrates no strong departures from the substantive conclusions reached
in this paper when models that accommodate missing data are used (Hill 2001).
The present analysis focuses on one question at a time. The coding we use in our analyses
for the response Y for the i th individual at the t th time point is
Yt;i D
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 for “strongly disagree”
2 for “mildly disagree”
3 for “no opinion”
4 for “mildly agree”
5 for “strongly agree”
Despite the ordering presented here, we emphasize that our model does not necessitate
conceptualization of the responses on an ordinal scale from strong agreement to strong
disagreement (with or without allowing for the “no opinion” category to lie in the center of
this ordinal ranking). This concept is discussed in greater detail in Section 2.2.
The bivariate correlations between our Swiss items display the same temporal pattern
as that which led Converse to his black-and-white model in the first place, but they suggest
a rather high level of stability: they are located in the range (.45 to .50) of the correlations
for American social welfare items reported by Converse and Markus (1979) for the less
constraining issues and in the range of the American moral issues (.62 to .64) for the more
constraining issues2 (for more detail see Hill and Kriesi 2001).
2.2 Building a Model
Our goal in building a model is elucidation of the empirical support for a specific theory
about opinion-changing behavior (as well as some derivatives of this theory). Therefore
we build a model that is specifically tailored to our political science theory. To do so we
first clearly lay out the substantive theory we want to represent and then translate it into
probability statements.
2.2.1 The Theory
We postulate the existence of three categories of people with regard to opinion-changing
behavior: opinion holders, vacillating changers, and durable changers. Each of these groups
2Note, however, that the issue-specific stability observed for our Swiss policy measures still falls far short of the
stability (.81 to .83) that has been measured in the United States for a basic political orientation such as one’s
party identification.
304 Jennifer L. Hill and Hanspeter Kriesi
behaves differently on average. Perhaps most importantly, we would expect the probabil-
ity that an individual’s series of responses over time follows a particular type of pattern
to vary across opinion-changing behavior groups. In addition, though, we might expect
differences between groups with regard to other characteristics of interest. For instance,
there is no reason to believe that members of different groups would have the same prob-
ability of agreeing with a given issue. Strength of opinion is also likely to vary across
groups.
Another general aspect of our theory is that we have no reason to believe that a “no
opinion” response in any way represents a middle ground between agreeing with and dis-
agreeing with an issue, as opposed to a distinct category. Such an ordering would force us
to make a potentially strong assumption about how these categories are related.
Accordingly, there are four key elements to the model we would like to build. First,
the model must include a different submodel for each opinion-changing group and each
submodel should allow for different types of behaviors that distinguish the groups. Second,
our model must accommodate the fact that group membership labels are not observed.
Third, we would like to treat agreeing with an issue, holding no opinion about an issue, and
disagreeing with an issue as distinct categories without forcing them to represent an ordering
from one extreme to another with “no opinion” lying in the middle of the continuum. Fourth,
and in keeping with our general goal of elucidating theory, model parameters should be
readily interpretable in terms of the underlying political science construct.
2.2.2 Finite Mixture Models
Sometimes the data we observe are not all generated by the same process. Consider
American citizens’ attitudes toward a tax cut or their rating of the current president’s
performance. If we plot data measuring these attitudes (from a 7-point Likert scale, for
instance), the distribution might appear bimodal, with a peak somewhere on each end of the
spectrum. Such data can be conceptualized as belonging to a mixture of two distributions,
each corresponding roughly to identification with one of the two major parties. If party
membership were recorded, then each distribution could be modeled separately so that the
unique aspects of each could be considered. Unfortunately, this class variable may itself be
unobserved. If this is the case, we can represent this structure by a finite mixture model.
Formally, finite mixture distributions can be described by
p(x) D …1 f1(x)C ¢ ¢ ¢ C …J f J (x) D
JX
jD1
f j (x)
where the f j (x) can each represent different distributions (even belonging to different
families of distributions) relying, potentially, on entirely distinct parameters (Everitt and
Hand 1981; Titterington et al. 1985; Lindsay 1995).
We use a finite mixture model to accommodate the first two of our key features. In our
example, group membership is the unobserved class variable. Note how this model allows
for specification of different submodels, f j (x), corresponding to different types of behavior,
for each opinion-changing group.
Unobserved categories are sometimes referred to as “latent classes.” The analysis we
perform should therefore be distinguished from a set of methods commonly referred to as
latent class analysis (McCutcheon 1987). Latent class analysis attempts to uncover latent
structure in categorical data by identifying latent (unobserved) classes such that within
each class the observed variables are independent of each other. Our model also postulates
the existence of unobserved classes; however, these classes are defined by more complex
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probabilistic structures than the “local independence” properties common to traditional
models for latent class analysis.
2.2.3 Competing Off-the-Shelf Models and Desired Features Three and Four
There are several standard models and corresponding off-the-shelf software packages that
can be used to “fit” longitudinal survey data. Time-series or panel data models, which
postulate normal or ordered multinomial probit or logit models at each time point, represent
one set of options. Alternatively a multinomial structure that allows for different probabilities
for each pattern of responses (necessitating many constraints on the cell probabilities due
to the sparseness of the data relative to the number of possible patterns) can be used.
Any of these methods could be subsumed within a finite mixture model, although model
fitting would then require more sophisticated techniques. The standard models present
difficulties with our third and fourth key elements, however. The time-series models do
not represent a natural mapping from the parametric specification to the types of behavior
in which we are interested. Moreover, they force an ordinal interpretation of the survey
response categories.
The model we present in this paper is actually mathematically equivalent to a product
multinomial model, where the group membership labels are treated as unknown parameters,
and with a particular set of complicated constraints. We believe that our parameterization
and its associated conceptual representation (see, for instance, the tree structure displayed
in Fig. 1), however, constitute a far clearer mapping from the theoretical model to the
probabilistic model. Therefore the parameters actually all have direct substantive meaning
in terms of our theory regarding opinion-changing behavior. In addition our model does not
necessitate an assumption of ordinal response categories.
2.3 Parameterization: The Full Model
Study participants are characterized as belonging to one of the three groups described briefly
in Section 1 with regard to each policy measure for the duration of the study period. These
qualifications are important: the labels used to describe people are policy issue and time
period dependent. For instance, an individual could be a durable changer regarding the CO2
tax issue during the time period spanned by this study, however, he might well be an opinion
holder regarding the same issue 10 years later. Similarly, an individual might be a durable
changer with respect to the tax on CO2 during this time period but an opinion holder with
respect to speed limits during this time period.
If we denote the three-component vector random variable for group membership for
the i th person as Gi D (g1;i ; g2;i ; g3;i ), the probability of falling into each group can be
described by the following parameters:
…1 D Pr(individual i belongs to opinion-holder group) D Pr(Gi D v1)
…2 D Pr(individual i belongs to vacillating-changer group) D Pr(Gi D v2)
…3 D Pr(individual i belongs to durable-changer group) D Pr(Gi D v3)
where …1C…2C…3 D 1, and the v j are simply vectors of length 3 with a 1 in the j th position
and 0 elsewhere. These are the parameters of primary interest; the rest of the parameters,
described in the following three sections, are used to characterize the response behavior of
each of the three groups. A fuller, more intuitive description of these submodels is given by
Hill and Kriesi (2001).
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2.3.1 Opinion Holders
Opinion holders are defined as those who maintain an opinion either for or against an issue.
Anyone who responded with a “no opinion” at any time point cannot be in this group, nor
can anyone who crossed an “opinion boundary” across time points (i.e., an opinion holder
cannot switch from an agree response to a disagree response, or vice versa).
Two parameters,
fi1 D Pr(Y1;i D 1 or 2 jGi D v1)
and
–1 D Pr(Yt;i D 1 j Y1;i 2 f1; 2g;Gi D v1) D Pr(Yt;i D 5 j Y1;i 2 f4; 5g;Gi D v1)
are used to describe the behavior of opinion holders across the four time points, given the
constraints
Pr(Yt;i D 3 jGi D v1) D 0; 8t
Pr(Yt;i 2 f3; 4; 5g j Y1;i 2 f1; 2g;Gi D v1) D 0; 8t 6D 1
Pr(Yt;i 2 f1; 2; 3g j Y1;i 2 f4; 5g;Gi D v1) D 0; 8t 6D 1
which formally set
1¡ fi1 D Pr(Y1;i D 4 or 5 jGi D v1)
1¡ –1 D Pr(Yt;i D 2 j Y1;i 2 f1; 2g;Gi D v1) D Pr(Yt;i D 4 j Y1;i 2 f4; 5g;Gi D v1)
These parameters allow for differing probabilities of being for or against an issue and,
conditional on being for or against an issue, differing probabilities of feeling strongly or
mildly about it. Note that for parsimony the parameter for the extremity or strength3 of the
reaction (–1) does not vary across time periods or across opinions (agree or disagree), even
though this may not be the most accurate representation of reality.
2.3.2 Vacillating Changers
For the purposes of this model, we again make a simplifying assumption: the members of
the group we label vacillating changers do not change their opinions in any particularly
systematic way. Moreover, the responses of the members of this group are considered to
be independent across time points. Therefore any pattern of responses could characterize a
vacillating changer, for a total of 625 possible response patterns.
On the basis of this assumption, the behavior of a vacillating changer at any time point
can be characterized by three parameters:
’2 D Pr(Yt;i D 3 jGi D v2)
fi2 D Pr(Yt;i ‰ f1; 2g jGi D v2)
–2 D Pr(Yt;i D 1 j Yt;i ‰ f1; 2g;Gi D v2) D Pr(Yt;i D 5 j Yt;i ‰ f4; 5g;Gi D v2)
3Extremity is one of many indicators of opinion or attitude strength (see Krosnick and Fabrigar 1995).
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Our model does allow vacillating changers to have some minimal structure in their re-
sponses. They are allowed different probabilities (constant over time) for having no opinion,
agreeing, or disagreeing. The model also allows them to have different probabilities (con-
stant over time) for extreme versus mild responses, given that they express an opinion.
The fact that our model postulates that the probability to agree can be different from the
probability to disagree is contrary to Converse’s black-and-white model, which assumes
that the probability that a vacillating changer agrees with an issue is equal to the probability
that he disagrees with the issue:
1¡ ’2
2
D fi2 D 1¡ ’2 ¡ fi2
This constraint reflects Converse’s notion of “non-attitudes” among unstable opinion chang-
ers and will be tested in Section 5.
2.3.3 Durable Changers
Durable changers are defined as those who change their opinion or who form an opinion
based on some rational decision-making process perhaps prompted by additional infor-
mation or further consideration of an issue. Durable changers are allowed to change their
opinion (e.g. from mildly disagreeing to strongly agreeing) exactly once across the four
time periods. This characteristic distinguishes them from the vacillating changers that are
allowed to move back and forth freely. In contrast to vacillating changers, durable changers
adopt a new, stable opinion, either by changing sides or by forming an opinion for the first
time. They are not allowed to change to the “no opinion” position, but they can move out
of this position. This implies that those switching from a for position must switch to an
against position, and vice versa.
It is arguable that a reasonable relaxation of this model would be to allow individuals to
change from a given opinion (strong or weak), to the “no opinion” category, and then to the
opposite opinion (strong or weak). Empirically we find that this pattern does not happen too
often (once for speed limits and car free zones, five times for gas price increase and parking
restrictions, eight times for CO2 tax and electric vehicles). Even if all such individuals were
allocated to the durable-changers category for the questions with the highest incidence of
them, it would increase the average proportion of durable changers by just slightly over one
percent. Therefore, we are not overly concerned about the impact of this possible model
oversimplification on our inferences.
Since the durable-changers group comprises only individuals who switch exactly once
across the four time periods, the parametric descriptions of their behavior revolve primarily
around descriptions of this opinion switch. Only one parameter is specified for post-switch
behavior, the probability that someone who starts with no opinion switches to a disagree
response,
fi
(post)
3 D Pr
¡
Y(t⁄i C1);i 2 f1; 2g j Yt⁄i D 3;Gi D v3
¢
where t⁄i represents the time period directly prior to a change in opinion. This simplicity is
achieved because we do not differentiate this behavior by switching time and switches to
no opinion are not allowed.
However, in parametrizing the opinions that the durable changers switch away from,
we distinguish between leaving an opinion category and leaving the “no opinion” position.
This is the distinction between durably changing an opinion and forming a durable opinion
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for the first time. Moreover, we allow the direction of change to differ between the first
period, on the one hand, and the second and third period, on the other hand. Since durable
changers are assumed to be strongly influenced by the additional information which they
receive, the direction of their change is a function of the “tone” of the public debate. Four
parameters define the probabilities for these options:
’
(pre1)
3 D Pr
¡
Yt⁄i ;i D 3 j t⁄i D 1;Gi D v3
¢
’
(pre2)
3 D Pr
¡
Yt⁄i ;i D 3 j t⁄i 2 f2; 3g;Gi D v3
¢
fi
(pre1)
3 D Pr
¡
Yt⁄i ;i 2 f1; 2g j t⁄i D 1;Gi D v3
¢
fi
(pre2)
3 D Pr
¡
Yt⁄i ;i 2 f1; 2g j t⁄i 2 f2; 3g;Gi D v3
¢
Accounting for panel or “Socratic” effects (McGuire 1960; Jagodzinski et al. 1987; Saris
and van den Putte 1987), which typically occur between the first two waves of a panel study,
we distinguish between the probability that an opinion change occurs after the first period
and the probability that it occurs after the second or third period (these last two are set equal
to each other). This is captured by
¿3 D Pr(t⁄i D 1 jGi D v3)
1¡ ¿3
2
D Pr(t⁄i D 2) D Pr(t⁄i D 3)
Note the constraint that
Pr
¡
Y(t⁄i C1);i D 3
¢ D 0
Finally, as we did for the other two groups, we again allow for a stable share of strong
opinions:
–3 D Pr(Yt;i D 1 j Yt;i 2 f1; 2g;Gi D v3)
D Pr(Yt;i D 5 j Yt;i 2 f4; 5g;Gi D v3)
2.4 The Model as a Tree
It is helpful to think of the finite mixture model reflecting the behavior of these three groups
as being represented by a tree structure such as the one illustrated in Fig. 1. This tree slightly
oversimplifies the representation of our model (the vacillating-changer branch of the tree,
for instance, represents the response for just one given time period). However, it does reflect
the types of behavior that are pertinent for defining each group.
This model is an example of a finite mixture model because it can be conceived as a
mixture of three separate models where the mixing proportions are unknown. In this case
the full model is a mixture of the models for each opinion-changing behavior group because,
in general, we cannot deterministically separate one group from the next since the members
of the different groups cannot be identified as such. Our model will be better behaved than
some mixture models, however, because of the structure placed on the behavior of each
group. In particular, individuals who cross opinion boundaries more than once can only
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be members of the vacillating-changers group. This identification creates a nonsymmetric
parameter space which prevents label-switching in the algorithm used to fit this model.
Recent examples of fully Bayesian analyses of mixture model applications include Gelman
and King (1990), Turner and West (1993), and Belin and Rubin (1995).
2.5 The Likelihood
We derive the likelihood in a slightly roundabout fashion to make explicit the connection
between our model and the product multinomial model discussed briefly in the beginning
of Section 2.2. There are 625 response patterns possible in the data. Therefore a simple
model for the observed data is a multinomial distribution where each person has a certain
probability of falling into each of 625 response-pattern bins. However, this model would
ignore the group structure in which we are most interested. An extension of this idea to a
model for the complete data which includes not only the response patterns, X , but also the
group membership indicators, G, would be a product multinomial model with a separate
multinomial model for each group.
Let Xi denote a vector random variable of length 625 with elements Xk;i , where Xk;i D 1
if individual i has response pattern k and 0 otherwise. If the group membership of each
study participant were known, the likelihood function would be
L(µ j X;G) D
NY
iD1
625Y
kD1
3Y
jD1
(… j pk¢ j )xk;i g j;i
where µ represents the model parameters, and pk¢ j denotes the probability4 of belong-
ing to cell k (having response pattern k) given that one is in group j . This is called the
“complete-data likelihood” because it ignores the missingness of the group membership
labels.
The likelihood function given only the observed data (which does not include the group
membership labels), however, is
L(µ j X ) D
NY
iD1
L(µ j Xi )
D
NY
iD1
X
Gi23
L(µ j Xi ;Gi )
D
NY
iD1
X
Gi23
625Y
kD1
3Y
jD1
(… j pk¢ j )xk;i g j;i
D
NY
iD1
X
Gi23
625Y
kD1
(…1 pk:1)xk;i g1;i (…2 pk:2)xk;i g2;i (…3 pk:3)xk;i g3;i
D
NY
iD1
µ
…1
625Y
kD1
pxk:ik:1 C …2
625Y
kD1
pxk:ik:2 C …3
625Y
kD1
pxk:ik:3
¶
(1)
where 3 D f(1; 0; 0); (0; 1; 0); (0; 0; 1)g, the sample space for Gi for all i .
4Note that although many of the pk¢ j are structural zeros, the corresponding xk;i g j;i will always be zero as well,
and 00 D 1.
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Maximum-likelihood estimation, which requires us to maximize Eq. (1) as a function
of µ , is complicated by the summation in this expression. In addition, we have nowhere
near enough data to estimate all the parameters in this more general model, nor would
these estimates be particularly meaningful for political science theory without some further
structure. Clearly some constraints need to be put on these 1875 cell probabilities.
2.6 Reexpressing the Data
The tree structure described in Section 2.4, however, illustrates exactly the types of be-
havior that we are most interested in and, consequently, the types of behavior we need
to measure. Rather than defining a survey respondent by her response pattern (and corre-
sponding multinomial cell), for example, “1255,” we need to characterize her in terms of
a limited number of more general variables, which allow us to reproduce her trajectory,
e.g., as someone who started out opposed to the issue (first extremely, “1,” then not, “2”)
and then crossed an opinion boundary and expressed strong agreement with the issue, “55.”
Therefore all of the data have been reexpressed in terms of the variables described below.
These variables, along with group indicators, define the elements which are used in the
parameter estimates. That is, since the model parameters represent the probabilities of cer-
tain types of behavior, the transformed data measure the incidences of these same types of
behavior.
Ai D
(
1 if the i th person’s initial response is a 4 or 5
0 otherwise
Bi D number of the i th individual’s responses that are either 1 or 5 across all t
Ci D number of the i th individual’s responses that are 3
Di D number of times the i th individual crosses an opinion boundary
Ei D
‰
0 if Di 6D 1
t⁄i otherwise
Fi D
(
0 if the i th individual’s preswitch response is a 1, 2, or 3, orDi 6D 1
1 if the i th individual’s preswitch response is a 4 or 5
Hi D
(
0 if the i th individual’s preswitch response is a 1, 2, 4, or 5, orDi 6D 1
1 if the i th individual’s preswitch response is a 3
Mi D
(
0 if the i th individual’s postswitch response is a 1, 2, or 3, orDi 6D 1
1 if the i th individual’s postswitch response is a 4 or 5
Qi D
(
0 if the i th individual’s postswitch response is a 1, 2, 4, or 5, orDi 6D 1
1 if the i th individual’s postswitch response is a 3
Ri D number of the i th individual’s responses that are either 1 or 2 across all t
The vector of all of these random variables for individual i is donoted Zi .
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2.7 Reexpression of the Likelihood
Using the new variables described in Section 2.6 (and for the reasons described in
Section 2.2), we can reexpress the complete-data likelihood as
L(µ jZ ;G) D
NY
iD1
3Y
jD1
…
g j;i
j p
z
j;z
g j;i
where pzj;i is the probability that individual i belongs to group j conditional on his observed
data, Zi .
The conditional probability of individual i being an opinion holder ( j D 1) given her
responses (Zi ) can be calculated as
pz1;i D
¡
fi
1¡Ai
1 (1¡ fi1)Ai (1¡ –1)(4¡Bi )–Bi1
¢ ⁄ I(Ci D 0)I(Di D 0)
where I(¢) is an indicator function which equals 1 if the condition in parentheses holds and
equals 0 otherwise. The indicator functions constrain this probability to be zero for behavior
that is disallowed for this group: responding with no opinion during at least one time period,
I(Ci > 0); and, switching opinions, I(Di 6D 0).
Similarly, the conditional probability of belonging to each of the other groups given the
observed responses can be expressed by the functions
pz2;i D ’Ci2 fiRi2 (1¡ ’2 ¡ fi2)(4¡Ci¡Ri )–Bi (1¡ –2)(4¡Ci¡Bi )
pz3;i D
•
¿
I(EiD1)
3
(1¡ ¿3)
2
I(I Ei 2f2;3g) ‡
’
(pre1)Hi
3 fi
(pre1)(1¡Fi )(1¡Hi )
3
¡
1¡ fi(pre1)3 ¡ ’(pre1)3
¢Fi·I(EiD1)
£
‡
’
(pre2)Hi
3 fi
(pre2)(1¡Fi )(1¡Hi )
3
¡
1¡ ’(pre2)3 ¡ fi(pre2)3
¢Fi·I(Ei 2f2;3g)
£
‡¡
1¡ fi(post)3
¢Mi ¡
fi
(post)
3
¢(1¡Mi )·Hi
–
Bi
3 (1¡ –3)(4¡Bi¡Ci )
‚
I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)
Clearly this model formulation ignores potentially relevant background information such
as gender, age, political affiliation, and income. Later efforts will incorporate this informa-
tion in more complicated models.
3 Fitting the Model: EM and Data Augmentation
This section describes the algorithms that were used to fit this model. There is no off-the-shelf
software for this particular model. However, the general algorithms presented are straight-
forward and accepted as standard practice within Statistics. Programming was performed in
S-plus (though virtually any programming language potentially could have been used).5 The
first algorithm discussed, EM, can be used to find maximum-likelihood estimates for each
parameter. This is helpful, but not fully satisfactory, if we are also concerned with our un-
certainty about the parameter values. The data augmentation algorithm estimates the entire
distribution (given the data) for each parameter in our model.
5In particular, any package that allows the user to draw from multinomial distributions and gamma distributions
(which in turn can be converted to draws from beta and Dirichlet distributions) can be used.
Classification by Opinion-Changing Behavior 313
3.1 A Maximum-Likelihood Algorithm—EM
The problem with using our model to make inferences is that it relies on knowledge of
group membership, which, in practice, we do not have. The EM algorithm is a method
which can be used to compute maximum-likelihood estimates in the presence of missing
data. It is able to sidestep the fact that we do not have group membership indicators by
focusing on the fact that if we had observed these “missing” data, the problem would be
simple. It is an iterative algorithm with two steps: one that “fills in” the missing data, the
E-step (expectation step); and one that estimates parameters using both the observed and
the filled-in data, the M-step (maximization step). EM has the desirable quality that the
value of the observed-data log-likelihood increases at every step.
We iterate between the two steps until an accepted definition of convergence is reached.
In our case, iterations continued until the log-likelihood increased by less than 1£ 10¡10.
Starting values of parameters for the first iteration were chosen at random. Checks were
performed to ensure that the same maximum-likelihood estimates for each model were
reached given a wide variety (100) of randomly chosen starting values; this helps to rule
out multimodality of the likelihood.
3.1.1 The E-Step
The E-step for this model replaces the missing data with their expected values. Specifically,
we take the expected value of the complete-data log likelihood, ‘,
Q D E£‘(µ j Z ;G) j Z ; µ⁄
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of the missing data, conditional on the
observed data, Zi , and the parameters from the previous iteration of the M-step,
p
¡
Gi j Zi ; µ
¢ D 3Y
jD1
ˆ
… j pzj;iP3
jD1 … j p
z
j;i
!g j;i
Q is linear in the missing data (the group indicators), so the E-step reduces to finding the
expectation of the missing data and plugging it into the complete-data log likelihood. The
expectation of the indicator for group j and individual i is
E
£
Gi D v j j Zi ; µ
⁄ D … j pzj;iP3
jD1 … j p
z
j;i
which is the probability, given individual i’s response pattern, of falling into group j relative
to the other groups.
3.1.2 The M-Step
In each iteration, the M-step finds the parameter estimates, µ , that maximize Q.
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The M-step finds maximum-likelihood estimates for all of our parameters. All of these
parameter estimates are quite intuitive. For instance, the estimate for ’2 is
’ˆ2 D
PN
iD1 g2;i Ci
4T2
where T2 is the sum of the individual-specific weights, g2;i (calculated in the E-step),
corresponding to the vacillating-changers group. This estimate takes the weighted sum
of “no opinion” responses (Ci ) across the four time periods (where each weight reflects
the probability that the person is a vacillating changer) and divides it by the number of
people we expect to belong to this group (the sum of the weights, T2) multiplied by four (for
the four time periods; four possible responses for each person). This is the logical estimate
for the parameters representing the probability that a vacillating changer will respond with
“no opinion” at any given time point.
The following are the equations for the entire set of parameter estimates that maximize
Q given the estimates of Gi D (g1;i ; g2;i ; g3;i ) from the E-step (where Tj D
PN
iD1 g j;i ):
…ˆ j D TjP3
jD1 Tj
; j D 1; 2; 3
fˆi1 D
PN
iD1 g1;i I(Ci D 0)I(Di D 0)(1¡ Ai )PN
iD1 g1;i I(Ci D 0)I(Di D 0)
ˆ–1 D
PN
iD1 g1;i I(Ci D 0)I(Di D 0)Bi
4
PN
iD1 g1;i I(Ci D 0)I(Di D 0)
’ˆ2 D
PN
iD1 g2;i Ci
4T2
fˆi2 D
PN
iD1 g2;i Ri
4T2
ˆ–2 D
PN
iD1 g2;i BiPN
iD1 g2;i (4¡ Ci )
’ˆ
(pre1)
3 D
PN
iD1 g3;i I(Ei D 1)I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)HiPN
iD1 g3;i I(Ei D 1)I(Qi D 0)I(Di D 1)
fˆi
(pre1)
3 D
PN
iD1 g3;i I(Ei D 1)I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)(1¡ Fi )(1¡ Hi )PN
iD1 g3;i I(Ei D 1)I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)
’ˆ
(pre2)
3 D
PN
iD1 g3;i I(Ei 2 f2; 3g)I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)HiPN
iD1 g3;i I(Ei 2 f2; 3g)I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)
fˆi
(pre2)
3 D
PN
iD1 g3;i I(Ei 2 f2; 3g)I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)(1¡ Fi )(1¡ Hi )PN
iD1 g3;i I(Ei 2 f2; 3g)I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)
fˆi
(post)
3 D
PN
iD1 g3;i Hi I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)(1¡ Mi )PN
iD1 g3;i Hi I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)
ˆ–3 D
PN
iD1 g3;i I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)BiPN
iD1 g3;i I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)(4¡ Ci )
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¿ˆ3 D
PN
iD1 g3;i I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)I(Ei D 1)PN
iD1 g3;i I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)
3.2 The Data Augmentation Algorithm
While point estimates of the parameters are helpful, they are insufficient to answer all the
questions we might have about the parameters. For instance, it is useful to understand how
much uncertainty there is about the parameter estimate. One way to do this is to estimate the
entire distribution of each parameter given the data we have observed; this distribution is
called the posterior distribution. Posterior distributions formally combine the distribution of
the data given unknown parameter values with a prior distribution on the parameters. This
prior distribution quantifies our beliefs about the parameter values before we see any data.
The priors used in this analysis reflect our lack of a priori information about the parameter
values and are thus relatively “noninformative” (as discussed in greater detail later in this
section).
The goal of the DA algorithm is to get draws from the posterior distribution p(µ j Z ). It
has two basic steps in this problem:
1. Draw the “missing data,” group membership indicators, given the parameters.
2. Draw the parameters, µ D (…1; …2; …3; fi1; –1; : : :), given the group membership
indicators.
3.2.1 Drawing Group Indicators Given Parameters
We can use the observed data for a given person along with parameter values to determine
the probability that he falls in each group simply by plugging these values into the models
we have specified for each group.6 Then we can use these probabilities to temporarily (i.e.,
for one iteration) classify people into groups. For each person we sample from a trinomial
distribution of sample size 1 with probabilities equal to (draws of) the relative probabilities
of belonging to each group (given individual characteristics):
p
¡
Gi j µ; Zi
¢ D Multˆ …1 pz1;iP3
jD1 … j p
z
j;i
;
…2 pz2;iP3
jD1 … j p
z
j;i
;
…3 pz3;iP3
jD1 … j p
z
j;i
!
These draws specify group membership labels.
3.2.2 Drawing Parameters Given Group Indicators
We sample parameters from their distribution conditioning on the data (i.e., using the infor-
mation we have about our survey participants through their response behavior as measured
by Z ) and the group indicators we drew in the previous step. This is akin to fitting a separate
model for each group using only those people classified in the previous step to that group
for each analysis.
6We obtain parameter values from the second step in each iteration, so for the first iteration we just start at a
random place in the parameter space.
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The posterior distribution can be expressed as p(µ j Z ;G) D L(µ j Z ;G)p(µ ), where
p(µ ) is the prior distribution on the parameters, µ . The complete data likelihood, L(µ j Z ;G),
can be expressed as
L(µ j Z ;G) D
NY
iD1
3Y
jD1
…
g j;i
j p
z
j;i
g j;i
D
NY
iD1
…1
g1;i
¡£
fi
(1¡Ai )
1 (1¡ fi1)Ai (1¡ –1)(4¡Bi )–Bi1
⁄(I(Ci D 0)I(Di D 0))¢g1:i
£…2g2;i
¡
’
Ci
2 fi
Ri
2 (1¡ ’2 ¡ fi2)(4¡Ci¡Ri )–Bi2 (1¡ –2)(4¡Ci¡Bi )
¢g2;i
£…3g3;i
‰•
¿
I(EiD1)
3
(1¡ ¿3)I(Ei2f2;3g)
2
£
‡
’
(pre1)Hi
3 fi
(prel)(1¡Fi )(1¡Hi )
3
¡
1¡ fi(pre1)3 ¡ ’(pre1)3
¢Fi·I(EiD1)
£
‡
’
(pre2)Hi
3 fi
(pre2)(1¡Fi )(1¡Hi )
3
¡
1¡ ’(pre2)3 ¡ fi(pre2)3
¢Fi·I(Ei2f2;3g)
£
‡¡
1¡ fi(post)3
¢Mi ¡
fi
(post)
3
¢(1¡Mi )·Hi
–3
Bi (1¡ –3)(4¡Bi¡Ci )
‚
£ I(Di D 1)I(Qi D 0)
¾g3;i
We use Beta and Dirichlet distributions for our prior distributions. A Beta distribution
is commonly used when modeling a probability or percentage because a Beta random vari-
able is constrained to lie between 0 and 1. The mean of a Beta (a; b) is a=b. Therefore,
the greater a is relative to b, the more the mass of the distribution is located to the left
of .5, and vice versa. The variance of the distribution is ab=(a C b)2(a C b C 1). There-
fore the bigger the values of the parameters, the smaller the variance, and the tighter the
distribution is about its mean. The Beta (1; 1) distribution is equivalent to a uniform dis-
tribution from 0 to 1. The Dirichlet distribution is just the multivariate extension of the
Beta distribution. The Dirichlet distribution with k parameters acts as a distribution for
k probabilities (or percentages) that all sum to 1 (such as is the case for the parameters
of a multinomial distribution). The Beta distribution is the conjugate prior7 for the bi-
nomial distribution; the Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior for the multinomial
distribution.
If we assume a priori independence of appropriate parameters, we can factor p(µ ) into
six independent Beta distributions (for fi1; –1; –2; ¿3; fi(post)3 , and –3) and four independent
Dirichlet distributions [for (…1; …2; …3), (’2; fi2; (1¡’2¡fi2)); (’(pre1)3 ; fi(pre1)3 ; (1¡’(pre1)3 ¡
fi
(pre1)
3 )), and (’(pre2)3 ; fi(pre2)3 ; (1¡’(pre2)3 ¡fi(pre2)3 ))]. Parameters can then be drawn from the
appropriate posterior distributions (found by standard conditional probability calculations).
For example, if p(fi1; 1 ¡ fi1) is specified as a Beta (a; b), then we would draw fi (and
(1¡ fi)) from Beta [(a C N ¡PNiD1 Ai ); (b CPNiD1 Ai )].
7A conjugate prior is a prior that, when combined with a likelihood, yields a posterior distribution in the same
family as itself. A Beta is conjugate to a binomial likelihood because the resulting posterior distribution is again
Beta. Conjugate priors are generally the easiest to work with computationally.
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Given the tree structure of the model and the conditional independence that it implies,
prior independence of the parameters does not seem an unwarranted assumption. Priors
were chosen to be as noninformative as possible. Beta and Dirichlet priors can be con-
ceptualized as “pseudo-counts.” For instance, using a Beta (1; 1) prior for the distribution
of fi1 can be thought of as adding one person to the group of opinion holders who were
against the issue and one person to the group of opinion holders who were for the issue.
The prior specifications used in these analyses give equal weight a priori to both (or all
three) possibilities modeled by a particular distribution and keep the hyperparameters (pa-
rameters of the priors) quite small. The primary prior used in this analysis is one which
adds two “pseudo-people” to each opinion-changing behavior group (opinion holders, vac-
illating changers, durable changers)—this is a Dirichlet distribution with parameters all
equaling two—and then divides these people up evenly among the remaining categories.
For instance, one person is allocated to agree and one person to disagree with the issue for
opinion holders [a Beta (1; 1)]. The alternative priors tested uses this same idea but one
starts with one person per opinion-changing group and the other starts with four people in
each. Parameter estimates for the posterior distribution do not change meaningfully across
priors.
3.2.3 Convergence
Iterations continue until we converge to a stationary distribution. Convergence can be as-
sessed using a variety of diagnostics. We used the ˆR statistic proposed by Gelman and Rubin
(1992) and its multivariate extension discussed by Brooks and Gelman (1998). These di-
agnostics monitor the mixing behavior of several chains, each originating from a different
starting point. Then as many draws as are desired to estimate the empirical distribution
sufficiently are taken. We used five chains, each with 2500 iterations, with the first 500
iterations treated as burn-in and discarded.
3.2.4 Superiority of the DA Algorithm
The DA algorithm was used in this problem because non-Bayesian techniques have generally
been found to be flawed when applied to mixture models, particularly when calculating
standard errors. In addition, the approximations which have been derived to accommodate
testing of certain hypotheses are rather limited (see, e.g., Titterington et al. 1985) and cannot
approach the flexibility in the types of inferences that can be performed trivially once we can
sample from the posterior distribution (for a discussion, see van Dyk and Protassov 1999).
Assuming that the correct model is used, the DA algorithm will converge to the correct
posterior distribution. The properties exhibited in our simulations lead us to believe that
our DA algorithms had converged well before we started saving draws from the posterior
distribution.
4 Results
In this section we report the results of the model fit via the DA algorithm for each of the
different policy measures. Table 1 presents the point estimate of the mean for each parameter
as well as a 95% interval from the empirical posterior distribution (each with 10,000 draws).
For all questions we see evidence for the existence of the durable-changer group (…3). The
majority of people do seem to be either opinion holders or vacillating changers, however.
Note that the vacillating changers, to varying degrees across question, appear to exhibit
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Table 1 Estimate of parameters and their uncertainty for the unconstrained modela
Speed limits CO2 tax Gas price increase
Parameter Mean 95% interval Mean 95% interval Mean 95% interval
…1 0.53 (0.49, 0.57) 0.40 (0.36, 0.45) 0.44 (0.40, 0.49)
…2 0.39 (0.33, 0.45) 0.53 (0.48, 0.58) 0.48 (0.43, 0.53)
…3 0.08 (0.05, 0.12) 0.07 (0.04, 0.10) 0.08 (0.05, 0.11)
fi1 0.53 (0.48, 0.59) 0.48 (0.41, 0.54) 0.63 (0.57, 0.69)
–1 0.67 (0.64, 0.70) 0.65 (0.61, 0.69) 0.68 (0.65, 0.71)
’2 0.03 (0.02, 0.04) 0.06 (0.04, 0.07) 0.07 (0.05, 0.08)
fi2 0.45 (0.39, 0.50) 0.37 (0.34, 0.41) 0.45 (0.42, 0.49)
–2 0.22 (0.19, 0.25) 0.27 (0.24, 0.29) 0.25 (0.22, 0.28)
’
(pre1)
3 0.34 (0.16, 0.57) 0.45 (0.27, 0.66) 0.45 (0.26, 0.65)
fi
(pre1)
3 0.10 (0.00, 0.30) 0.17 (0.00, 0.37) 0.10 (0.00, 0.26)
’
(pre2)
3 0.09 (0.00, 0.26) 0.36 (0.00, 0.98) 0.06 (0.00, 0.32)
fi
(pre2)
3 0.84 (0.56, 0.99) 0.48 (0.00, 0.98) 0.86 (0.47, 1.00)
fi
(post)
3 0.35 (0.11, 0.66) 0.71 (0.44, 1.00) 0.81 (0.53, 1.00)
–3 0.49 (0.35, 0.67) 0.50 (0.39, 0.60) 0.57 (0.43, 0.71)
¿3 0.59 (0.42, 0.76) 0.88 (0.71, 0.99) 0.75 (0.57, 0.92)
Electric Car Parking
Mean 95% interval Mean 95% interval Mean 95% interval
…1 0.39 (0.34, 0.45) 0.58 (0.53, 0.63) 0.37 (0.32, 0.43)
…2 0.57 (0.51, 0.63) 0.40 (0.35, 0.45) 0.58 (0.52, 0.64)
…3 0.04 (0.01, 0.06) 0.02 (0.00, 0.04) 0.05 (0.02, 0.09)
fi1 0.10 (0.06, 0.14) 0.07 (0.05, 0.10) 0.19 (0.08, 0.28)
–1 0.57 (0.52, 0.62) 0.68 (0.65, 0.71) 0.61 (0.54, 0.66)
’2 0.06 (0.05, 0.07) 0.02 (0.01, 0.03) 0.04 (0.03, 0.07)
fi2 0.24 (0.21, 0.27) 0.31 (0.27, 0.36) 0.33 (0.22, 0.40)
–2 0.20 (0.18, 0.23) 0.26 (0.23, 0.30) 0.23 (0.19, 0.27)
’
(pre1)
3 0.15 (0.00, 0.55) 0.15 (0.00, 0.76) 0.36 (0.00, 0.86)
fi
(pre1)
3 0.31 (0.00, 0.75) 0.16 (0.00, 0.77) 0.17 (0.00, 0.64)
’
(pre2)
3 0.41 (0.01, 0.98) 0.25 (0.00, 0.95) 0.13 (0.00, 0.87)
fi
(pre2)
3 0.47 (0.00, 0.95) 0.28 (0.00, 0.96) 0.79 (0.01, 1.00)
fi
(post)
3 0.10 (0.00, 0.74) 0.35 (0.00, 1.00) 0.33 (0.00, 0.96)
–3 0.23 (0.06, 0.45) 0.37 (0.02, 0.82) 0.36 (0.12, 0.62)
¿3 0.73 (0.40, 0.95) 0.63 (0.14, 0.97) 0.60 (0.30, 0.92)
aNotational convention is as follows. Subscripts: 1 D opinion holders; 2 D vacillating changers; 3 D durable
changers. Superscripts: pre1 D opinion before a switch occuring after wave 1; pre 2 D opinion before a switch
occuring after wave 2 or 3; post D opinion after a switch. Greek letters: … D group membership; fi D disagree;
’ D no opinion; – D extreme; ¿ D switched after 1st time period.
slight preferences with regard to the issues at hand. In particular, the estimate of the mean
of fi2 for the nonconstraining questions (electric, car, parking) appears to have been affected
by the near-consensus views of the opinion holders with regard to these issues.
Note also that some of the intervals are very large, indicating a very low precision of
some of the parameter estimates. This reflects our uncertainty regarding some of these
parameters caused by a lack of a sufficient number of people who engaged in the types of
behaviors to which these parameters correspond.
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Table 2 Differences in average individual-level response variability across groups
Group
Issue Opinion holders Vacillating changers Durable changers
Speed limits 0.35 (0.34, 0.36) 1.03 (0.97, 1.09) 1.35 (0.89, 1.75)
Tax on CO2 0.36 (0.35, 0.37) 1.07 (1.03, 1.11) 1.21 (1.08, 1.33)
Gas price increase 0.37 (0.36, 0.38) 1.09 (1.06, 1.12) 1.31 (1.21, 1.41)
Electric vehicles 0.41 (0.40, 0.42) 0.88 (0.84, 0.93) 1.18 (0.95, 1.36)
Car-free zones 0.35 (0.34, 0.35) 1.03 (0.97, 1.09) 1.35 (0.89, 1.75)
Parking restrictions 0.39 (0.37, 0.40) 1.08 (1.04, 1.12) 1.32 (1.15, 1.52)
4.1 Evidence for the Measurement-Error Explanation of Response Instability
We would also like to use our model to explore the evidence for or against the measurement-
error interpretation of response instability.
To do this we calculate the posterior distribution of the average individual-level standard
deviation in responses for each group p(s¯( j); j Y;G); j D 1; 2; 3, where,
s¯( j) D 1
Tj
X
i2fi :GiDv j g
si
and where si D
q
1
3 (Yi ¡ ¯Yi )2 and ¯Yi D 14
P
t Yt;i . These calculations treat the survey
responses as ordinal (using the ordering displayed in Section 2.1) just as the measurement
error models do. If the response variability looks fairly similar (i.e., as if they came from the
same distribution) across groups, then we might not mind labeling this variability simply
as unexplained variation or measurement error.
Table 2 presents the means for each of these distributions; 95% intervals are presented
in parentheses. This table demonstrates that the average size of individual-level standard
deviation in responses is quite different across groups. The vacillating changers have on
average between double and triple the amount of response variation compared to the opinion
holders. The durable changers have routinely even more variation on average than the
vacillating changers. Given the implausibility of assuming vastly different measurement
errors for different people, it seems rather more likely that this variation is composed of
both measurement error and true opinion instability.
4.2 Model Simplifications
To test two of our most basic assumptions—existence of three versus two groups, vacillating
changer’s nonequal chance of disagreeing versus agreeing with an issue—two alternatives
to the primary model were also fit.
1. Constrained model. This model imposes the constraint implied by Converse’s black-
and-white model, discussed in Section 2.3.2,
1¡ ’2
2
D fi2 D 1¡ ’2 ¡ fi2 (2)
This constraint forces the probability that a vacillating changer agrees with an issue
to be the same as the probability that he disagrees with that issue. Therefore, in this
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model, fi2 need not be defined as a separate parameter (it has a one-to-one relationship
with ’2).
2. Two-group model. This model includes only the opinion holders and the vacillat-
ing changers and uses the same parameterization for these groups as described in
Section 2.2 except that it also imposes the Converse constraint formalized in Eq. (2).
Comparisons between the constrained three-group model and the two-group model will
help us to examine the evidence for the existence of the durable-changer category (at least
for a group such as the one defined in Section 2.2) given the existence of Converse’s hy-
pothesized categories, which we have labeled the opinion holders and vacillating changers.
Comparisons between the unconstrained and the constrained model can be used to examine
the evidence for the strict definition of the vacillating-changers group. If this constraint does
not appear to fit the data adequately, then there is support for the theory that the behavior of
this group is not truly random in choosing between agree (mildly and strongly) and disagree
(mildly and strongly) responses.
It is probable that none of these models is detailed enough to capture the subtleties in
opinion-changing behavior that exist in this time period. However, there was not enough
data to support adequately the more complicated and highly-parameterized models that we
attempted to fit.
5 Diagnostics
We examine the adequacy of our model and estimation algorithm in two ways: statistical
checks of the model and statistical checks of the algorithm used to fit the model. For
substantive model checks, please refer to Hill and Kriesi (2001).
5.1 Statistical Diagnostics
We used two standard statistical diagnostics to assess model adequacy: posterior predictive
checks test the adequacy of specific aspects of the model; Bayes factors test which of the
postulated models fits the data better.
To assess statistically how well specific aspects of each of our models fit the data, we
performed posterior predictive checks (Rubin 1984; Gelman et al. 1996), which generally
take the following form.
1. For each draw of model parameters from the posterior distribution, generate a new
data set.
2. For each data set calculate a statistic which measures a relevant feature of the model.
3. Plot the sampling distribution (histogram) of these statistics and see where the ob-
served value of the statistic (i.e., the statistic calculated from the data that were actually
observed) lies in relation to this distribution.
4. If this observed value appears to be consistent enough with the statistics calculated
from the generated data (e.g., it falls reasonably well within the bounds of the his-
togram), then we will not reject this aspect of the model. Lack of consistency with, or
extremity compared to, the generated statistics can be characterized by the percentage
of the generated statistics that are more extreme than the observed statistic. We use
the convention of referring to this percentage as the posterior predictive p value.
Of course, as usual, failure to reject the model does not imply full acceptance of the
model, but it heightens our confidence in the model. Posterior predictive checks are easy
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to implement and they allow for the use of a flexible class of statistics without having to
analytically calculating sampling distributions for each.
It is important to remember that each statistic represents only one measure of goodness
of fit. Posterior predictive checks are not generally intended for choosing one model over
another unless it is possible to check every aspect that is different between models. They are
generally intended to help investigate the evidence for lack of fit of a particular characteristic
of a given model. Of course if we are satisfied with the overall fit of two models, we would
like to choose between them, and there is a limited number of differences between them,
we can use posterior predictive checks to test the implications of these differences.
One statistic used to check model adequacy is the percentage of people who get classified
as durable changers given that they switch opinions exactly once […ˆ3=
P
i (Di D 1)]. This
statistic reflects the classifying behavior of the model. For this check we generate data under
the two-group model to create the null distribution for the statistic and fit the constrained
three-group model to each data set to calculate …ˆ3. The p values are •.02 for all questions
except for car-free zones, which has a p value of .12.
If the two-group model were an adequate representation of the data, then generating data
under this smaller model would yield statistics from the same distribution as our observed
statistic. These p values contradict this hypothesis of the adequacy of the two-group model
for all questions except for car-free zones. This result likely reflects the fact that the car-
free-zones question has the lowest estimates of the percentage of durable changers of all of
the questions.
A statistic which targets the difference between the constrained and the unconstrained
three-group models is
fˆi2 ¡ (1¡ ’ˆ2 ¡ fˆi2)
This represents the discrepancy between the estimated probability of disagreeing and that
of agreeing with an issue for a vacillating changer (which should be 0 on average for the
constrained model). Data were generated under the constrained model, and the statistics
calculated from these data sets form the null distribution. The observed data statistic should
fall well within the bounds of the null distribution (i.e., we should see high p values) if the
constraint seems reasonable for our data.
The only data set for which the constraint appears to be potentially reasonable (the
p value is .18) is the gas prices data set. In all the other cases the imposed constraint does
not appear to be consistent with the data (p values all<.005), which means that we cannot
presuppose purely random (agree/disagree) behavior on the part of the vacillating changers.
Even in the particular case of the price of gas, the result does not necessarily imply such
random behavior on the part of the vacillating changers. We have estimates of the average
values ’2 and fi2 in the unconstrained model of .07 and .45, respectively. This implies that
the estimated probability of agreeing (mildly or strongly) is .48 (1–.45–.07), which is nearly
equal to the probability of disagreeing (mildly or strongly), .45. It could just be that these
proportions reflect the “true” opinion distribution of the moment among the vacillating
changers with respect to a substantial increase in the price of gas.
A collection of checks was performed that measured the ability of our primary model
(three-group, unconstrained) to replicate the frequency of a variety of popular response
patterns. This is an extremely ambitious check given that there exist 625 possible response
patterns and our model has only 14 parameters. The model (for all questions) generally
had trouble replicating the two or three most popular patterns but increased in precision
thereafter. A check which examined the sum of the frequencies of a randomly chosen
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foursome of the 20 most popular patterns for a given data set had p values that varied from
0 to .32 depending on the question being examined and the patterns chosen by the check.
Most of the time (approximately 88%) the observed statistic at least fell within the empirical
bounds of the reference distribution. Checks that increased the number of popular patterns
from which the four to be checked were drawn yielded better results; checks that increased
the number of patterns drawn from a set number of popular patterns yielded worse results.
Several other posterior predictive checks were performed which indicate a good fit for
our primary model. These include more global checks using the log-likelihood statistic and
a likelihood-ratio statistic comparing the two- and three-group models as well as checks on
the frequency of extreme responses, no-opinion responses or agree responses. Altogether,
the posterior predictive checks provide evidence regarding the superior fit of the three-
group model versus the two-group model. This provides indirect evidence for the existence
of durable changers. In addition, these checks provide little support for the constrained
definition of the vacillating changers consistent with completely random agree/disagree
responses. The results of the posterior predictive checks we performed do not appear to be
sensitive to the choice in prior.
We also calculated Bayes factors for each survey question to test the weight of evidence
for the constrained three-group model versus the two-group model and to test the uncon-
strained model versus the constrained three-group models. The results are consistent with
conclusions obtained with the posterior predictive checks (for more details see Hill and
Kriesi 2001).
Bayes factors, however, were more sensitive than the posterior predictive checks to choice
in prior, particularly for those questions where the results yielded borderline conclusions.
Priors that added half as many “pseudo-people” yielded results of no positive evidence for
the superiority of the unconstrained three-group model over the constrained three-group
model for the speed limits question and more positive evidence for this comparison for the
gas price question [2 loge(B) D 4]. They did nothing to alter our conclusions about the
other borderline case, car-free zones.
5.2 Assessing Frequency Properties of Posterior Intervals
It is advisable when using any statistical technique to be aware of its frequency properties.
For instance, if we formed 95% intervals over repeated samples from the true distribution,
we would like to know that these intervals would cover the true value at least 95% of
the time. Since we never really know the true distribution, we can only approximate this
scenario. However, such an exercise should still be quite informative.
A simulation was performed which generated 100 data sets using the full model with the
maximum-likelihood estimates from the speed limits data as parameters. A DA algorithm
(1000 steps) was run on each data set and 95% intervals were calculated for each parameter
in all data sets. Then whether or not the interval covered the “true” value of the parameter
from our constructed model was recorded. On average, both across parameters and across
data sets, the intervals covered the “true” parameter values slightly more than 95% of the
time. This is reassuring evidence about the DA algorithm used in this problem.
6 Conclusion
We have built a statistical model that reflects the many features of our substantive theories
about opinion-changing behavior. To do this we used specifically parameterized submod-
els for each opinion-changing group within a finite mixture framework. We have used a
Bayesian approach to this problem [for a helpful exposition about the benefits of Bayesian
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techniques in social science problems see Jackman (2000)], fit via data augmentation, which
allows for inferences from a full posterior distribution and accommodates flexible model
checks such as posterior predictive checks and Bayes factors. The development of new
software8 is beginning to make this approach more accessible to researchers with a wider
variety of statistical backgrounds.
One benefit of using the Bayesian paradigm in this problem is the straightforward cal-
culation of distributions of functions of our parameters and observed data within our data
augmentation algorithm. In particular, we were able to draw from the distribution of the
average individual-level response standard deviations for each group. We found evidence
of quite different levels of response variability across groups. This result stands in contrast
to the classic form of the measurement-error model, which essentially assumes that there
is only one group of respondents all of whom are characterized by the same measurement
error.
The posterior distributions for parameters for the vacillating changers reveal that mem-
bers of this “unstable” group exhibit different patterns of support for the constraining
versus the unconstraining issues (although they generally have much weaker opinions than
the opinion holders). Moreover, the model checks provided strong evidence against the
constraint implicit in Converse’s original model that vacillating changers exhibit “nonatti-
tudes.” Thus, our model provides considerable support for Zaller’s notion of ambivalence
due to the fact that we have uncovered some nonrandom structure to the behavior of the
vacillating changers. This is compatible with an interpretation of their response behavior in
terms of ambivalence.
We conclude from the statistical checks and the substantive results that we have succeeded
in creating a model that plausibly reflects a new version of an old theory of opinion-changing
behavior that takes an intermediary position between Zaller’s model and Converse’s model.
There are respondents (on average, between 37 and 58% of the Swiss sample) with stable,
structured opinions who correspond to Converse’s perfectly stable group. There are also
respondents (on average between 39 and 58% of the Swiss sample) with unstable opinions
whose response behavior corresponds to Zaller’s model. These figures compare favorably
to those of Converse (1970), who estimated with his black-and-white model that 80% of
the respondents in his sample were random opinion changers. In addition, through the
introduction of our durable-changer group, our model finds evidence for respondents (on
average between 2 and 8% of the Swiss sample) who appear to exhibit what Converse
considered “meaningful change of opinion or ‘conversion’” as a result of the public debate.9
However, our results suggest that, short of major events, durable changes in individual
opinions occur only rarely. Most individual opinion change is likely to consist of short-term
reactions to external stimuli.
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